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WHAT’S LOVE GOT TO DO WITH IT? INTEREST-
CONVERGENCE AS A LENS TO VIEW STATE 
RATIFICATION OF POST EMANCIPATION SLAVE 
MARRIAGES 
DANNÉ L. JOHNSON* 
INTRODUCTION 
As an honored participant in the Western New England University 
School of Law’s Building the Arc of Justice: The Life and Legal Thought 
of Derrick Bell Symposium, I examined and reflected on the late 
Professor Bell’s contribution to my understanding of life and law.  I 
looked for his legacy, mark, and influence on notions of fairness, justice, 
and motives.  I hope to go beyond the veneer, the glossy wax coating, on 
the life that we know and the stories that we tell, or that we avoid telling, 
in the hope of revealing a more well-rounded truth.  If eight people stand 
in a circle and describe an inanimate object resting at the center of the 
circle, each will have a different view, a different story, a different 
description.  Consider a crowd on a busy street witnessing a purse 
snatching.  Each saw the event, but it takes several eyewitnesses to arrive 
at a composite sketch of the perpetrator because each witness has a 
different vantage point or view.1  Finally, consider a nation watching the 
emancipation and the journey toward freedom of hundreds of thousands 
of former slaves—men, women, and children.  The different angles, 
views, perspectives, reflections, and vantage points are countless.  Each 
account is valid and truthful but perhaps none will be exactly 
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thank Western New England University School of Law, the Center for Gender Studies & 
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The Life and Legal Thought of Derrick Bell Symposium.  The author also thanks the 
Oklahoma City University School of Law for support during the writing process, Professor 
Lee Peoples, the OCU library staff, and OCU students and research assistants Kevin Garrett 
and Emily Eleftherakis.  Copyright © 2013, Danné L. Johnson. 
1. “[T]he issue [is] whether such conflicts or inconsistencies reflect intentional 
falsehoods, or whether they are inadvertent or merely the product of different people seeing 
the same event from different perspectives and with different recall.”  Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., 
Race and National Origin as Influential Factors in Juvenile Detention, 3 D.C. L. REV. 355, 
367 (1995). 
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representative.2  Too often we judge and select a single likeable version 
of the truth to credit and promote, resulting in a single account, which 
serves as the whole or complete truth.3  We devalue, discredit, and 
ignore the stories that fail to comfort us or otherwise paint us in a less 
than flattering light.4  We tell the Christopher Columbus story from his 
eyes, not from the eyes of the Native Americans that he encountered.5  
Interest-convergence requires that we give voice to competing stories 
and theories as a method to understand events more fully. 
This Article examines whether interest-convergence and/or critical 
legal theory more thoroughly explains post-emancipation state 
ratification of former Slave marriages.  Section I of this Article discusses 
interest-convergence theory and critical legal theory.  Section II 
discusses the disruption of the Civil War, Emancipation, and 
Reconstruction to the American South and its attempts to reestablish 
normalcy.  Section III examines the contours of Pre-Civil War Marriage.  
Section IV discusses the competing interests of the Freedmen and 
whites, and the convergence of those interests resulting in post-
emancipation state ratification of former Slave marriages. 
 
2. “As [one] African American lawyer [observed], it was unsettling for me to read some 
of the history in Emancipation.  It was troubling because many of the difficulties African 
American law students and lawyers withstood over fifty-one years ago still exist today.”  
Cynthia R. Mabry, Emancipation: The Making of the Black Lawyer, 1844 -1944, 14 NAT’L 
BLACK L.J. 173, 178 (1995) (book review). 
3. “When I say that a thing is true, I mean that I cannot help believing it.”  Oliver W. 
Holmes, Ideals and Doubts, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 303-04 (1920). 
4. “[O]rdinarily we are hesitant to accept claims of truth that we recognize fly in the 
face of our beliefs about the world and how we should live.”  Kent Greenawalt, Grounds for 
Political Judgment: The Status of Personal Experience and the Autonomy and Generality of 
Principles of Restraint, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 647, 663 (1993). 
5. “Such a distorted view of Christopher Columbus as a heroic friend of the Native 
Americans is quite different from what his personal journal reveals.”  Evan Mascagni, The 
Legal Process of Cultural Genocide: Chinese Destruction of Tibetan Culture V. U.S. 
Destruction of Native American Culture, 14 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 241, 242 (2011).   
“[The Indians] are so naïve and so free with their possessions that no one who has 
not witnessed them would believe it. When you ask for something they have, they 
never say no. To the contrary, they offer to share with anyone . . . . They would 
make fine servants . . . . With fifty men we could subjugate them all and make them 
do whatever we want.”  
Id. (quoting HANS KONING, COLUMBUS: HIS ENTERPRISE (1992)) (excerpting Christopher 
Columbus’ journal shortly after arriving in the Americas). 
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I. ALL GOD’S CHILDREN NEED SEEING GLASSES6 
In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. 
There is no other way.7 
The late Professor Derrick A. Bell was widely known for his 
contributions to civil rights and community justice as well as his 
leadership as a scholar, teacher, and activist.8  Bell passed away at age 
seventy-one on October 5, 2011, leaving a legacy to legal scholars that 
has fostered a new perspective in the way we now view the relationship 
between race and the law.9  This promising new lens provides clarity to 
accurately assess our nation’s history. 
Bell was born on November 6, 1930, in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania to 
Derrick Albert and Ada Elizabeth Childress Bell.10  Many of Bell’s early 
influences in life are directly attributable to his parents.  Bell credited his 
mother for being the source of his willingness to challenge authority.11  
Bell’s father never trusted whites, and advised him of the realities of 
being a Black man in a white man’s world.12  After graduating high 
school, he became the first member of his family to go to college.13  He 
later became an Air Force officer for two years.  After leaving the Air 
 
6. Maya Angelou authored All of God’s Children Need Traveling Shoes.  This 
autobiographical work received high accolades and brought attention to the lives and histories 
of African Americans.  “Angelou’s journey into Africa is a journey into herself, into that part 
of every Afro-American’s soul that is still wedded to Africa, that still yearns for a home.”  
Barbara T. Christian, Black Author Explores Africa and Finds Herself, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 23, 
1986, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1986-03-23/entertainment/8601220083_1_angelou-
afro-african.  
7. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). 
8. “Most people know Derrick Bell as the renegade civil rights scholar who took a leave 
of absence from Harvard Law School in spring 1990 to protest the school’s failure to put an 
African-American woman on its permanent faculty.”  Stephanie B. Goldberg, Who’s Afraid of 
Derrick Bel?l: A Conversation on Harvard, Storytelling and the Meaning of Color, 78 A.B.A. 
J. 56, 56 (1992). 
9. See generally DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN 
ARDENT PROTESTER 10 (1994).  
10. Biography of Professor Derrick Bell, DERRICK BELL OFFICIAL SITE, 
http://professorderrickbell.com/about/ (last visited May 13, 2014). 
11. Bell relates one story:  
My mother, standing in front of the barred teller’s window, taking cash from her 
purse, waved it in front of the clerk . . . [S]he told him, “This is the rent money. I 
have it—and you will get it when you fix the back steps so that my children won’t 
fall and hurt themselves.” 
BELL, supra note 9, at 11. 
12. Bell’s father told him, “Son, you must work hard because white folks are planning 
and scheming while we Negroes are eating and sleeping.” Id. at 14. 
13. Biography of Professor Derrick Bell, supra note 10.  
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Force, Bell decided to attend the University of Pittsburgh Law School 
where he was the only Black student.14  Furthermore, there were no 
women in his class.15  Earning his LL.B. degree in 1957, he studied, 
applied himself, and kept silent in spite of racially insensitive remarks 
made by professors.16 
Bell’s first job after law school was with the Civil Rights Division 
of the U.S. Justice Department.17  He was the only African American 
among thousands of lawyers.  Claiming a conflict of interest, the 
government asked him to resign his membership in the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to 
continue his employment.18  After refusing, the Justice Department 
moved him to a desk in a hallway and barred him from doing any race-
related work.19  Bell resigned after two years, a decision comparable to 
vocational suicide.  After leaving, however, he went on to become First 
Assistant Counsel at the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund 
under Thurgood Marshall, where he supervised more than 300 school 
desegregation cases in Mississippi.20 
In 1968, Bell turned to teaching at the University of Southern 
 
14. Eric Ilhyung Lee, Nomination of Derrick A. Bell, Jr. To Be An Associate Justice of 
The Supreme Court of the United States: The Chronicles of A Civil Rights Activist, 22 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 363, 382 (1996). 
15. Id. 
16. BELL, supra note 9, at 16. 
17. Roberta S. Mitchell, The Founding of Capital’s Law Review: A Retrospective, 25 
CAP. U. L. REV. 237, 248 n. 39 (1996). 
Professor Derrick Albert Bell . . . was an attorney with the Civil Rights Division of 
the Justice Department from 1957-1959, first assistant counsel of the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund from 1960-1966, and deputy director of the Office of Civil Rights, 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare from 1966-1968.  He was a professor 
of law at Harvard University from 1971-1980 and again from 1986-1992.  In the 
interim he served as dean of the Oregan [sic] Law School.  He has written 
extensively in the area of constitutional law and minority issues.  
Id.  
18. “[Bell’s] first professional act of defiance was in 1959, when he resigned from the 
Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division, rather than give up his membership in the 
NAACP.” Goldberg, supra note 8. 
19. In Memoriam: Derrick Bell, 1930-2011, NYU LAW http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/ 
DERRICK_BELL_MEMORIAM (last visited May 13, 2014). 
20. Id. “Well, that was a marvelous experience, working with the Legal Defense Fund 
in the early ‘60s, and it’s an experience I wouldn’t have gotten had I not done what I thought 
was right with regard to my NAACP membership with the Justice Department.”  Fresh Air: 
‘STAND UP, SPEAK OUT,’ Derrick Bell Told Law Students, NAT’L PUB.RADIO (Oct. 7, 
2011), available at http://www.npr.org/2011/10/07/141152319/stand-up-speak-out-derrick-
bell-told-law-students (Law professor and civil rights activist, Derrick Bell, speaking to Terry 
Gross in 1992). 
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California Law Center.21  A year later, he accepted an offer from 
Harvard Law School, becoming the first full-time Black law professor in 
Harvard’s history.22  Conceding that he did not have the usual 
prerequisites for a Harvard professorship, Bell attained tenure two years 
later.23 
While serving on the faculty of various other law schools, Bell 
consistently maintained a campaign for equality among the faculty.24  In 
1981, he left Harvard to become Dean of the University of Oregon Law 
School, later resigning “when the school refused to back his decision to 
offer tenure to an Asian-American woman.”25 
After seemingly vain attempts to persuade the Harvard faculty to 
appoint women of color on a permanent basis, Bell protested by taking 
two years unpaid leave.26  By 1990, he still lacked support for the hiring 
of women of color.  Despite being the law school’s first Black tenured 
professor, one of the most popular professors, and a regular recipient of 
prestigious grants, Harvard terminated him.  However, Bell’s strict 
adherence to his principles did not go unnoticed.27  During his first year 
of unpaid leave from Harvard, he began teaching at New York 
University (NYU) School of Law, as a visiting professor and remained at 
NYU where he continued his writings and activism until his death. 
 
21. Bell was an adjunct professor and executive director of the Western Center on Law 
& Poverty at the University of Southern California Law Center.  Lee, supra note 14, at 448.  
22. Id.  
23. Bell, supra note 9, at 14. 
24. Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 
1746 (1989). 
[T]he racial distinctiveness thesis [proposes that]: the belief (1) that minority 
scholars, like all people of color in the United States, have experienced racial 
oppression; (2) that this experience causes minority scholars to view the world with 
a different perspective than their white colleagues; and (3) that this different 
perspective displays itself in valuable ways in the work of minority scholars. Bell 
expresses one version of the distinctiveness thesis when he writes that ‘[r]ace can 
[be an important positive qualification] in filling a teaching position intended to 
interpret . . . the impact of racial discrimination on the law and lawyering. 
Id.  
25. Goldberg, supra note 8, at 56. 
26. “In 1992, Harvard Law School severed its sixteen-year association 
with  Professor Derrick Bell.  The school revoked his tenure in response to his refusal to end a 
self-imposed two-year absence.”  Mario L. Barnes, Book Note, “Each One, Pull One”: The 
Inspirational Methodology Behind an Impassioned Though Somewhat Flawed Protest, 1 
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 89, 93 (1994) (reviewing DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING 
AUTHORITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT PROTESTOR (1994)). 
27. “Professor Bell’s leave from Harvard was the protest which garnered him the 
greatest amount of attention, it was but one in a long sequence of confrontations with 
authority.”  Id. 
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A. Critical Race Theory 
Critical race theory (CRT) originated in the 1970s when lawyers, 
activists and legal scholars realized that advances made during the 
previous decade had stalled.28  It emerged in legal scholarship in the mid 
to late 1980s initially as a reaction to critical legal studies.29  Frequent 
use of the first person, storytelling, narrative, allegory, interdisciplinary 
treatment of law, and the unapologetic use of creativity characterize 
CRT writings and lecturing.30 
Bell, sometimes called the father of CRT,31 was generally in 
agreement with the focus of civil rights scholarship on race during the 
late 1960s and early 1970s.32  However, he and other scholars were 
deeply critical of civil rights scholars’ commitment to colorblindness and 
their focus on intentional discrimination, rather than a broader focus on 
the conditions of racial inequality.33  Bell believed that racism is 
pervasive in American life.34  Today, racism plays a role in almost every 
decision made by courts and legislatures alike.35  It is an existing legal 
 
28. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN 
INTRODUCTION 4 (2d ed. 2012). 
29. William C. Kidder, Legal Storytelling: Derailing A Civil Rights Legacy: The 
Chronicle of the Second Underground Railroad, 5 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 51, 59 (2002). 
“Many progressive law professors, including Derrick Bell, find that assigning short reflection 
pieces improves the quality of learning in their classrooms.” Id. at 51 n.2. 
 30. Derrick A. Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893, 
899 (1995). 
31. “Derrick Bell, considered a forefather of CRT, in . . . suggest[ing] that civil rights 
attorneys’ approach to litigating school cases for purposes of desegregating entire school 
districts (and balancing them racially) might be at odds with their clients[]—African American 
families.”  Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical Race 
Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 341 (2007). 
32. Critical race theory’s founding members are usually identified as Derrick Bell, 
Richard Delgado, Charles Lawrence, Mari Matsuda, and Patricia Williams.  See Bell, supra 
note 30, at 898 n.16. 
33. “One Stanford law professor agrees that scholarship on race and the law must reflect 
novel ideas to balance Critical Race Theory against ‘colorblindness viewed as the central 
impediment to policies that would further substantiate racial equality.’”  Starla J. Williams, A 
Values-Based Pedagogy for the Legal Academy in a Post-Racial Era, 16 J. GENDER RACE & 
JUST. 235, 259 (2013); see also, Douglas E. Litowitz, Some Critical Thoughts on Critical 
Race Theory, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 506 (1997). 
34. See generally, DERRICK A. BELL, JR., FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL (1992).  
Bell discusses how racist attitudes are built into American culture and society through an 
allegorical story.  
35. “[T]he quest by blacks for racial justice has resulted in dozens of major court 
decisions that led to social reforms of general significance.  These decisions are seldom 
society’s gifts.  The litigation is usually carefully planned and intelligently executed.”  Justin 
Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 149, 176 n.143 
(2011) (quoting Derrick A. Bell, Racial Remediation: An Historical Perspective on Current 
Conditions, 52 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 5, 14 (1976)).  
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system that is not as colorblind as it purports to be.36  Bell and others 
posited that the existing system repeatedly advantaged the majority, to 
the detriment of minorities.37 
CRT scholarship borrows from diverse intellectual traditions such 
as Marxism, pragmatism, nationalism, and postmodernism.38  As an 
intellectual movement, CRT aspires to eliminate all forms of oppression, 
as it is grounded in the experiences of real people.39  One of the defining 
elements of CRT is that the law must be understood historically and 
contextually.  Another central element to CRT is that the subjective 
experiences of women and African Americans make them well-suited 
for analyzing race relations and discrimination law.40  Having 
experienced racism and discrimination first-hand, women and minorities 
make better race relations scholars and professors.41  It is precisely 
because of their experiences that they see sexism and racism where the 
majority cannot or will not.42 
Roy L. Brooks has defined CRT as “a collection of critical stances 
against the existing legal order from a race-based point of view,” and 
 
36. Litowitz, supra note 33, at 506. 
The existing legal system (and mainstream legal scholarship as well) are not color-
blind although they pretend to be.  Despite the pretense of neutrality, the system has 
always worked to the disadvantage of people of color and it continues to do so.  
People of color are more likely to be convicted, to serve more time, to suffer 
arbitrary arrest and deprivation of liberty and property.  A pervasive but 
unconscious racism infects the legal system. 
Id.  
37. John A. Scanlan, Call and Response: The Particular and the General, 2000 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 639, 659 (2000). 
According to Bell, “[t]he narrative voice, the teller, is important to critical race 
theory in a way not understandable by those whose voices are tacitly deemed 
legitimate and authoritarian . . . . ”  Implicit in what . . . Bell [] writ[es] [is the] 
proposition[]: that those who have been, or presently are, subordinated can offer a 
counterdiscourse, a retelling of familiar tales from another perspective capable of 
piercing the comfortable armor of complacency worn so lightly by “majority” 
listeners . . . .  
Id. 
38. “Critical Race Theory is interdisciplinary and eclectic.  It borrows from several 
traditions, including liberalism, law and society, feminism, Marxism, poststructuralism, 
critical legal theory, pragmatism and nationalism.”  Eric Heinze, Truth and Myth in Critical 
Race Theory and Latcrit: Human Rights and the Ethnocentrism of Anti-Ethnocentrism, 20 
NAT’L BLACK L.J. 107, 114 (2007).  
39. Erika George, Book Note, Words As Sticks and Stones: Naming the Harm of Racist 
Speech, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 221 (1994) (reviewing MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., 
WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT (1993)). 
40. Litowitz, supra note 33, at 506.  
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
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says it focuses on the various ways in which the legal tradition adversely 
affects people of color not as individuals but as a group.43  CRT 
sometimes incorporates stories, narratives, and personal and revisionist 
histories to counter and challenge abstract legal arguments.44  By 
incorporating narrative, CRT hopes to inform legal analysis with 
experiences instead of abstractions.45  Thus, CRT attempts to analyze 
law and legal traditions through the history, contemporary experiences, 
and racial sensibilities of racial minorities in this country. 
B.  Interest-Convergence Theory 
Arguably Bell’s most notable contribution, the interest-convergence 
theory, has gone on to explain historical developments related to social 
justice.  He established the interest-convergence theory in his article 
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma.46  
Interest-convergence stands for the proposition that African American 
advancement to equality only develops to the extent it merges with 
whites’ interest.  The system changes when the interests of the powerful 
need it to change.  Social justice, if it occurs, is merely a collateral 
benefit.47 
Scholars can use interest-convergence as a tool or, as suggested 
here, a new pair of glasses, to help view historical developments related 
to equality and justice.  This new lens provides clarity regardless of the 
minority or marginalized group.  Therefore, interest-convergence is not a 
universal maxim, but rather a recurring historical pattern throughout 
American history.48 
 
43.  Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to 
Federal Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85, 85 (1994). 
44.  George, supra note 39, at 223. 
45.  Alan D. Freeman, Derrick Bell-Race and Class: The Dilemma of Liberal Reform, 
in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 458, 458-59 (Richard Delgado & Jean 
Stefancic eds., 1995).  
Bell’s approach to legal doctrine is unabashedly instrumental.  The only important 
question is whether doctrinal developments have improved, worsened, or left 
unchanged the actual lives of American blacks . . . . Bell eschews the realm of 
abstract, ahistorical, normative debate; he focuses instead on the relationships 
between doctrine and concrete change, and the extent to which doctrine can be 
manipulated to produce more change.  
Id. 
46. Derrick A. Bell Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980). 
47. Jennifer S. Hendricks, Converging Trajectories: Interest Convergence, Justice 
Kennedy, and Jeannie Suk’s “The Trajectory of Trauma,” 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 63, 
66 (2010). 
48. Stephen M. Feldman, Do the Right Thing: Understanding the Interest-Convergence 
Thesis, 106 NW. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 248, 259 (2012). 
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Whereas Racial Remediation primarily used a historical lens to 
examine the subordination of black rights, Professor Bell’s Brown v. 
Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma provided 
a distinctly more future-oriented account of the possibility for 
attaining Black advancement.  As the title suggests, Interest-
Convergence used Brown and its accompanying history as a point of 
departure.49 
Interest-convergence theory is now most often deployed to explain a 
particular case or a line of judicial decisions or legislative enactments.  
Like Bell, other legal scholars have used interest-convergence to explain 
a host of Supreme Court decisions, legislative enactments, and state 
court cases.50 
A close reading of Bell’s Interest-Convergence Dilemma illustrates 
that the Brown v. Board of Education51 ruling appealed to the interests of 
four specific groups.  First, the Brown decision facially appealed to those 
concerned about the immorality of racial inequality.  Next, and perhaps 
the driving force behind Brown, the decision appealed to whites in 
policymaking positions.  Bell posits that economic and political 
advances of policymakers motivated the abandonment of segregation.  
Legislators were aware that at least the appearance of equality in the 
United States would provide immediate credibility to its struggle with 
Communist countries to win over third world countries.52  In fact, the 
news media played an important role as it predicted Brown would have 
an impact on the world stage.53  By doing so, the media in effect pushed 
legislators to act. 
Third, the Brown decision appealed to American Black soldiers 
who fought in World War II.54  Black actor Paul Robeson described in 
1949, “[i]t is unthinkable . . . that American Negroes would go to war on 
behalf of those who have oppressed us for generations . . . against a 
country (the Soviet Union) which in one generation has raised our 
 
49. See Driver, supra note 35, at 160-61. 
50. Cynthia Lee, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the 
Cultural Defense, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 911, 925 (2007). 
51. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
52. “In many countries, where U.S. prestige and leadership have been damaged by the 
fact of U.S. segregation, it will come as a timely reassertion of the basic American principle 
that ‘all men are created equal.’”  Bell, supra note 46, at 524 (quoting Derrick Bell, Racial 
Remediation: An Historical Perspective on Current Conditions, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 5, 12 
n.31 (1976)).  
53. “Time magazine, for example, predicted that the international impact of Brown 
would be scarcely less important than its effect on the education of black children.”  Id. 
54. Id. 
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people to the full human dignity of mankind.”55  Therefore, fear of the 
spread of such sentiments among Blacks and their allies made the Brown 
decision appealing to policymakers, and perhaps even the courts. 
Finally, the fourth group to whom the Brown decision appealed was 
Southern whites.  Southerners seized the Brown decision as an economic 
opportunity to transition out of a plantation society.56  Bell’s theory 
suggested that segregation was viewed as a barrier to the South’s further 
industrialization.  In simple mathematical terms, Bell’s view of interest-
convergence can be expressed as follows: White Racism + Justice = 
White Racism.  In other words, when white racists are confronted with 
issues of justice, the end result is an expression of racism not justice.  
However, if the equation is White Racism + White Self-Interest = 
Justice, such as when white racists are confronted with protecting their 
economic interest, the outcome will be named justice, even though 
justice is a secondary result.57  Regardless of the need for justice, only 
white self-interest will motivate white racists to yield a result that 
appears to be justice.  When viewed through this lens, history is less his 
story and more accurately the story.  This leads to the conclusion that 
White Racism prevails against Justice unless White Self-Interest is in 
play as a factor.  In this Article, the interest-convergence theory is 
employed as a “new pair of glasses” through which to view Southern 
states’ legalization of the freedmen’s marriages after the Emancipation. 
II. THE CIVIL WAR, EMANCIPATION, AND DISRUPTION 
At the start of the Civil War, the Southern states had some of the 
most powerful and vibrant cities.58  According to the 1860 Census, what 
would become the eleven Confederate states had a population of 9.1 
million, including 3.5 million slaves, thirty-nine percent of the total 
population.59  The Census indicates that only six percent of the free 
population owned slaves, however the culture of slavery was widespread 
and enforced by all classes of people.60  The Civil War raged on for four 
 
55. DOROTHY BUTLER GILLIAM, PAUL ROBESON: ALL AMERICAN 137 (1976) 
(unwritten speech before the Partisans of Peace, World Peace Congress in Paris). 
56. Bell, supra note 46, at 524, 525. 
57. DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 46 (1972). 
58. “[Prior to the Civil War] slavery was a powerful economic institution . . . [it] was 
the central economic institution.  Almost all the leaders in southern states were slaveowners.” 
Paul Finkelman, How the Proslavery Constitution Led to the Civil War, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 405, 
408 (2013). 
59. See generally JOSEPH C. G. KENNEDY, POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN 
1860; COMPILED FROM THE ORIGINAL RETURNS OF THE EIGHTH CENSUS (1864). 
60. Id. 
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years leaving the rebelling American South demoralized and broken.61  
The social, economic, political, and legal systems were severely 
damaged.62 
During the time of war, the Confederate state issued its own 
currency and attempted to establish itself as a free and independent 
entity.63  The majority of the battles were fought in the upper Southern 
states, specifically Virginia and Tennessee.64  Of the approximately 297 
Confederate towns and cities, 162 of them were at some point occupied 
by Union troops and several of these cities were damaged or destroyed, 
including Atlanta, Charleston, Columbia, and Richmond.65  Historians 
have noted fourteen percent of the urban South lived in eleven major 
cities, which were damaged or destroyed during the Civil War.66  The 
rural South did not fare any better than the urban areas during the war.67  
While most rural land and farms were intact, the loss of the labor force, 
 
61. Civil War Facts, CIVIL WAR TRUST [hereinafter CIVIL WAR TRUST ], 
http://www.civilwar.org/education/history/faq/ (last visited May 13, 2014). 
62. In his first inaugural address:  
[President] Lincoln starts by contesting any claim that the federal government has 
violated or intends to violate the Constitution:  ‘Apprehension seems to exist among 
the people of the Southern States,’ Lincoln says, that his election poses a threat to 
their ‘property’ (an important choice of words), their peace, and their personal 
security. 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War As Constitutional Interpretation, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
691, 704 (2004).  See also, Saul Touster, Patriotic Gore: Studies in the Literature of the 
American Civil War, 76 HARV. L. REV. 434, 440 n.6 (1962) (book review) (“comments on 
Robert Penn Warren’s The Legacy of the Civil War, in which the theme of ‘the two fraudulent 
traditions’ is developed, as follows:  ‘In the South, it is . . . the ‘Great Alibi,’ which enables 
the Southerners to put the blame for everything that is lazy, provincial, barbarous and 
degraded in the South on the damage that they suffered in the war.’”). 
63. G. Edward White, Recovering the Legal History of the Confederacy, 68 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 467, 498 (2011).  
[T]he preamble to the Confederate Constitution substituted, for the opening words 
of the U.S. Constitution (“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a 
more perfect Union”) the phrase  “We, the people of the Confederate States, each 
state in its sovereign and independent character, in order to form a permanent 
Federal Government.”  The version employed by the Confederate delegates 
emphasized the ‘sovereign and independent character’ of states and the association 
of individuals with them . . . . 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
64. CIVIL WAR TRUST, supra note 61. 
65. Paul F. Paskoff, Measures of War: A Quantitative Examination of the Civil War’s 
Destructiveness in the Confederacy, in CIVIL WAR HISTORY 35-62 (2008). 
66. “As economic theory would predict, white planters were unable to form a successful 
voluntary cartel to stifle the free labor market, so they turned to government coercion.”  David 
E. Bernstein, The Law and Economics of Post-Civil War Restrictions on Interstate Migration 
by African-Americans, 76 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784 (1998). 
67. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SECOND AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 38 (1992). 
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slaves, horses, mules, cattle, and tools crippled the agricultural 
infrastructure and productivity.68  Further, Union blockades and other 
measures destroyed the economic well-being of the South.69  By the end 
of the war, the Confederate currency was worthless, its resources 
depleted, and financial institutions were on the verge of bankruptcy.70 
The Civil War transformed Southern society and normative values.  
Of the approximately 750,000 white men between the ages of fifteen and 
fifty-nine in the Confederate states, twenty percent of these men did not 
return from war.71  Many widows were unable to live independent lives 
without assets and the opportunity to remarry.72  Women often had to 
move in with other family members and seek alternatives to traditional 
courtships.  Young women often delayed marriages, became less 
selective in choosing a spouse, or rushed into marriage for fear of being 
an Old Maid.  Young women often had no prospects of marriage and the 
benefits that it offered.73  White Southern women were forced to seek 
work and a new type of Southern woman began to awaken.74  Women 
without kind or able relations were forced to live in refugee camps 
facing rationed food, violence, disease, and death.75  The lack of men in 
the Southern states altered the mythic Southern Belles and the Gallant 
Gentlemen. 
The end of the Civil War began a period of rehabilitating the people 
and the economy of the Southern states.  The Army had a principal role 
in reconstruction.  As the Union armies advanced in the South, the civil 
 
68. Many slaves in the rebelling states were freed at the end of the war, although slavery 
was not officially made illegal until the passage of the 13th Amendment.  Many other slaves 
enlisted with Union troops as a method of emancipation. 
69. “The Civil War devastated the economy of the South and left the country with 
significant deficits resulting from military operations as well as pension obligations to Union 
soldiers and their survivors.” Eric M. Zolt, Inequality, Collective Action, and Taxing and 
Spending Patterns of State and Local Governments, 62 TAX L. REV. 445, 468 (2009). 
70. For arguments that American bankruptcy law may have been sparked by the Civil 
War, how law has affected the development of the southern states and, in turn, how the South 
has affected the development of American law, see Carl H. Moneyhon, Book Note, 47 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 452 (2005) (reviewing ELIZABETH LEE THOMPSON, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF 
SOUTHERN DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AFTER THE CIVIL WAR. ATHENS: UNIVERSITY OF 
GEORGIA PRESS (2004)).  Thompson’s work explores these issues by examining the federal 
Bankruptcy Act of 1867, testing two major theses regarding the Act and its relationship with 
the South. 
71. American Experience: Death and the Civil War (PBS television broadcast, Sept. 18, 
2012). 
72. J. David Hacker et al., The Effect of the Civil War on Southern Marriage Patterns, 
76 J. SOUTH HIST. 39, 40 (2010). 
73. Id. at 55, 57. 
74. Id. at 69. 
75. JUDITH E. HARPER, WOMEN DURING THE CIVIL WAR: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 315-17 
(2004). 
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government collapsed.  The Army acted in place of the civil government 
by extending the official function of marshals from policing troop 
activities to policing and, in effect, governing the occupied areas.76  
During the period between the Civil War and a state’s readmission, upon 
application to the Union, states were subjected to military occupation.77  
The Military Reconstruction Act of 1867, passed by Congress, 
disbanded former Confederate state governments and implemented 
military authority, and organized these states into military districts.78  
Readmission to the Union was predicated on several steps.  Generally, 
the states were to denounce secession and to ratify the 13th, 14th, and 
15th Amendments of the Constitution.  These Amendments would 
abolish slavery, provide equal rights to all people within the state, and 
grant the franchise to former slaves.  The new or reconstructed state 
governments refused to adopt these Amendments initially and those 
states that adopted the Amendments adopted “Black Codes” to regulate 
the lives and bodies of former slaves, and to provide for their 
punishment.  In 1868, seven of the former Confederate states voted to 
ratify the 14th Amendment and in 1870 the 15th Amendment was 
ratified.79 
Near the end of the war, in March 1865, Congress created the 
Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands (“Freedmen’s 
Bureau”) to protect and help the freedmen live alongside their former 
owners.80  The Freedmen’s Bureau, through its agents, expended most of 
its efforts adjudicating differences between landless Black farmers and 
white landowners, encouraging labor contracts benefiting freedmen, 
providing rations to refugees and freedmen, and building schools for 
 
76. “[T]he military had tried to establish a legal order in which everyone was entitled to 
security in a society resting upon legal equality.  This had not been the measure of the first 
phase of Reconstruction during which the military was involved in the restoration of order.”  
Thomas D. Morris, Military Justice in the South, 1865-1868: South Carolina As A Test Case, 
54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 511, 553 (2006). 
77. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-
1877 Ch. 6 (1988). 
78. Gabriel J. Chin, The “Voting Rights Act of 1867”: The Constitutionality of Federal 
Regulation Suffrage During Reconstruction, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1581, 1589-91 (2004).  
Tennessee, which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, escaped invalidation and military 
subjugation.  Id. at 1582 n.2.  
79. Id. at 1581 n.1.  Texas, Mississippi, and Virginia were required to ratify the new 
amendment as a precondition for readmission to the Union.  
80. “As the war ended and the newly created Freedmen’s Bureau took charge of 
freedmen’s affairs, Bureau agents played a crucial role in spreading concepts of rights and 
equality throughout the southern countryside.”  Donald G. Nieman, From Slaves to Citizens: 
African-Americans, Rights Consciousness, and Reconstruction, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2115, 
2125 (1996). 
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freedmen.81 
Author Paul Scheip describes this period: 
As the southern states were restored to the Union under the 
reconstruction governments, military rule came to an end and civil 
authorities assumed full control of state offices.  This process was 
largely completed in 1870.  
 With the ending of Congressional reconstruction, the Army’s 
direct supervision of civil affairs in the South came to an end and the 
number of troops on occupation duty, which already had fallen off 
markedly, was reduced still further.  Now [the Freedman’s Bureau’s] 
mission was to preserve the new state governments [and support 
federal marshals] by continuing its protection of the [freedmen and 
their White supporters] upon whom the governments rested. . . .   
 . . . .   
 In April 1877, as a result of the compromise by which Rutherford 
B. Hayes became President after the disputed election of 1876, the 
last of the troops on reconstruction duty in the South were transferred 
to other duty and the federal military occupation of the South came 
to an end.82 
Unfortunately, readmission of seceded states seemed more 
important to the nation than securing the rights of former slaves, and the 
Freedmen’s Bureau never realized its full potential. 
The Civil War, emancipation, and reconstruction were a disruption 
to Southern life in every way.  The cities and the economy were 
decimated, social hierarchies and long held norms were in flux, and the 
Northern military was an unwelcomed presence.  Southern white 
interests needed to address these very important issues beginning with 
shedding the military presence, gaining admission to the Union, and 
reestablishing social, economic, and political order. 
A.  Disruption to the Social Order and State Interest in Reestablishing 
Control 
As the status quo began to change, the need for government control 
over the seeming disruption emerged.  Since the United States’ 
inception, the quintessential role of government has been to protect 
citizens from threats and catastrophe, seen in situations such as war and 
disease.  Thus, an established framework for how government should 
respond to such threats and risks was critical.  In government, two 
 
81. Id. 
82. Paul T. Scheip, Darkness & Light: The Interwar Years 1865-1898, in AMERICAN 
MILITARY HISTORY 281, 284-85 (Maurice Matloff, ed., 1969). 
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important paradigms have emerged as possible responses to social 
disruption: cost-benefit analysis and the precautionary principle.83  Cost-
benefit analysis has a variety of meanings and uses: 
At the highest level of generality . . . [cost-benefit analysis] is 
virtually synonymous with welfare economics, that is, economics 
used normatively . . . to provide guidance for the formation of policy, 
either public . . . or private.  At the other end of the scale of 
generality, the term denotes the use of . . . [a] wealth maximization 
rather than utility maximization[] concept of efficiency to evaluate 
government projects, such as the building of a dam or the 
procurement of a weapons system; government grants, such as grants 
for medical research; and government regulations, including not only 
administrative regulations dealing with health, the environment, and 
other heavily regulated activities but also statutes and common-law 
doctrines and decisions.84 
Under the precautionary principle, any risk is automatically deemed 
problematic, unless the person introducing it can prove otherwise.85  This 
method of response to disruption seeks to preempt threats or risks, 
whereas cost-benefit analysis can be used as “a method of pure 
evaluation, conducted wholly without regard to the possible use for its 
result in a decision.”86  Post-Civil War control of the social order was 
paramount to Reconstruction, and Congress set out to devise a plan for 
Southern states’ readmission to the Union.87  Both cost-benefit and 
precautionary techniques were necessary to smooth the stifled relation 
between the North and South and protect state interests while pushing a 
federal agenda.88 
As Southern states attempted to restore social order and end the 
various disruptions presented by the Civil War, the state post 
emancipation affirmation or legal ratification of slave marriages was just 
one solution. 
 
83. Gregory N. Mandel & James Thuo Gathii, Cost-Benefit Analysis Versus the 
Precautionary Principle: Beyond Cass Sunstein’s Law of Fear, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1037, 
1038 (2006) (book review). 
84. Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and Comment 
on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1153-54 (2000) (internal citations ommited). 
85. Twenty Years of CEI, 21 NO. 1 CAL. ENVTL. INSIDER 6 (2007). 
86. Posner, supra note 84, at 1154. 
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III. THE ROLE OF MARRIAGE IN THE SOCIAL HIERARCHY IN THE PRE-
CIVIL WAR SOUTH 
John Bouvier, the American author of an influential pre-Civil War 
legal encyclopedia, published in Philadelphia, explained that: “Marriage 
owes its institution to the law of nature, and its perfection to the 
municipal or civil law . . . . As an institution established by nature, it 
consists in the free and voluntary consent of both parties, in the 
reciprocal faith which they pledge to each other.”89  Throughout history, 
marriage has been used to control both men and women.  Marriage 
creates a private sphere of duty and obligation between two parties.  In 
the early 19th century, women could be protected, cared for, and directed 
toward the appropriate activities through marriage.  The acceptable 
gender related activities for women included child rearing and household 
chores, and in exchange for these services, a woman’s materials needs 
would be met.90  Once women married, all of their property came under 
the exclusive control of their husbands.91  Women were unable to work 
outside of the home, unable to contract, and unable to lay claim to 
property.  The laws rendered married women completely dependent on 
their husbands.  Husbands had an obligation to financially support a wife 
and any children.  Marriage in the southern United States was no 
different.  Marriage in the antebellum period was a form of guardianship 
of the husband over the wife.92 
A.  Interracial Relationships 
Before the Civil War, interracial marriages occurred with some 
regularity in the southern United States.  Few of these marriages actually 
took place between whites and full-blooded African Americans.  But a 
number of mixed-race women married white men, and a similar number 
of white women married mixed-race men.93  Additionally, there had 
always been some sexual relationships between white male slave owners 
and Black female slaves.94 
 
89. See 1 JOHN BOUVIER, INSTITUTES OF AMERICAN LAW 101 (1851). 
90. NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: “WOMAN’S SPHERE” IN NEW 
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(1986). 
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93. Gary B. Mills, Miscegenation and the Free Negro in Antebellum “Anglo” Alabama: 
A Reexamination of Southern Race Relations, 68 J. AM. HIST. 16, 21(1981). 
94. Michael J. Rosenfeld, Intermarriage, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RACE, ETHNICITY, 
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JOHNSON  
2014] WHAT’S LOVE GOT TO DO WITH IT?  159 
As tensions between races grew and the Civil War neared, white 
society worked diligently to make interracial relationships invisible.  
One technique used was “the ‘one-drop rule,’ which meant that anyone 
with as much as ‘one drop’ of non-White blood could not be considered 
white.”95  By legal definition, if a white slave master impregnated a 
Black slave, her child was Black and a slave as well.  “Formal marriage 
was generally not possible between slaves (because slaves had no legal 
standing), and therefore formal marriage between whites and slaves was 
impossible.”96 
Prior to the Civil War, several states had statutes prohibiting 
marriage between races.   
Notably, during the years of Reconstruction in the South . . . none of 
the statutes against miscegenation appear to have been repealed.  
Even outside the South, only a handful of states repealed their anti-
miscegenation statutes in the wake of the Civil War.  By 1910, 
twenty-eight states still had such statutes in effect.  Six of these 
states, all Southern, prohibited racial intermarriage through 
constitutional provisions. 
 Although the text of these statutes varied by state, all 28 statutes 
expressly prohibited intermarriage between whites and blacks . . . . 
The universal application to African Americans suggests that these 
prohibitions primarily sought to prevent white-black intermarriage.97 
In 1883, the Supreme Court ruled in Pace v. Alabama that state-
level bans on interracial marriage did not violate the 14th Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution, a ruling that held for more than 80 years.98 
 The laws regarding racial purity and interracial sex in [the] pre-
Civil War [South] sprang from two concerns. The first concern was 
with the maintenance of clear racial boundary lines in a society . . . 
based on racial slavery.  Starting in the late seventeenth century, 
white Virginians devised statutes to discourage racial intermingling 
and then statutes to classify racially the mixed-race children born 
when the earlier statutes were ineffective.  The statutes punishing 




97. Hrishi Karthikeyan & Gabriel J. Chin, Preserving Racial Identity: Population 
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they alone were charged with the responsibility for maintaining 
racial purity. 
 The second concern was with involuntary interracial sex . . . . This 
was seen primarily as an aspect of power relations between the 
races.99 
These early laws were applied more harshly to Black men than to 
white men, “punish[ing] only [B]lack men for interracial rape.”100 
B.  Slaves 
Slave “marriages” happened with some frequency in spite of the 
fact that slaves had no legal standing and lacked the ability to enter into 
formal agreements.101  Enslaved couples did not enjoy the rights and 
privileges that we commonly associate with marriage.  Slave marriages 
were done or entered into with slave owner consent, and through the 
slave community acknowledgment and custom.  The reasons behind 
these marriages range from love to companionship to owner coercion. 
Enslaved couples were not entitled to live together and often 
partners lived miles apart on different plantations.102  Abroad couples 
accounted for one-third of South Carolina marriages and one-half of 
Missouri marriages.103  For slave owners, these marriages would lead to 
an eventual increase in their labor force and economic well-being 
through child birth.  The owners of slave men held hope that family 
bonds would make slave men less likely to run away.  This mutual 
understanding among slave owners made abroad marriages possible.  
Slave men were able to visit with their wives as frequently as their 
mutual owners would allow.104  On these visits the husbands could 
provide very limited support economically, physically, or otherwise 
because of the length of the visit.  Slave husbands could not protect their 
wives from violence and sexual abuse.  Marriages on a single or 
neighboring plantation were often symbolized by simply living together 
 
99. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff , Racial Purity and Interracial 
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RAMEY BERRY & DELESO A. ALFORD, ENSLAVED WOMEN IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 
193 (2012).  
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or in a more formal way by slave owner permission.  A slave husband on 
the same plantation as the wife could in most instances cohabitate and 
provide assistance with chores and the sharing of food.  Slave marriages 
and other family relationships were often disrupted by the business of 
slavery.  Enslaved couples were separated from one another and their 
children through sales and lease arrangements.  This transient nature of 
family membership required a communal sense of family and often 
resulted in “non-white” or non-traditional households.  It was not 
uncommon to have siblings with different fathers and multiple spouses. 
For newly freed slaves, life after the Civil War underwent a 
dramatic change.  In growing numbers, Blacks were moving from the 
country to the city, from the South to the North.105  Emancipation was a 
disruption to the social order of the South, and as more African 
Americans migrated out of the rural South, Black migration and 
competition for jobs threatened the status quo of the North.106  Racial 
hostilities began to brew and images of the urban slave emerged, 
reflecting the perceived threat of an expanding Black labor force.107 
IV. THE MARRIAGE PATCH; STATE POST EMANCIPATION AFFIRMATION 
OR LEGAL RATIFICATION OF SLAVE MARRIAGE 
Most Southern states took action to affirm slave marriages as the 
Civil War came to a close. 
A.  State and Federal Action to Ratify Freedmen Marriages 
The legalization of slave marriages was an important result of 
emancipation.  During and immediately following the war, federal 
authorities, states, and missionaries encouraged former slaves to make 
their marriages legally binding for the first time.  This seeming 
acceptance of marriages also carried criminal penalties for bigotry, 
adultery, fornication, cohabitation, and other moral crimes.  In some 
states, failure to complete the paperwork to evidence a marriage was an 
“indictable misdemeanor.”108  The Alabama State Convention adopted a 
measure on September 29, 1865, legalizing former slave unions.109  The 
 
105. JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, 
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MARSHALL L. REV. 299, 331 (2006) (quoting North Carolina Act of March 10, 1866, Ch. 40, 
section 6). 
109. Id. at 322 (Ordinance No. 39, p. 64 (adopted as Revised Code of Alabama, No. 39) 
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District of Columbia field office established an office of the 
superintendent of marriages.  The superintendent’s office advised 
freedmen of the Act of Congress of July 25, 1866, (14 Stat. 236), which 
stipulated that “all color persons” in the District who recognized each 
other as man and wife prior to the law were now legally married and 
their children legitimate.110  Tennessee required that all freemen living 
together in contraband camps must be married.111 
Florida took an unusual approach to addressing the issue of 
legalization of slave relationships.  The Act of January 11, 1866 
required Black couples living together as putative husband and wife 
to marry before ‘some person legally authorized to perform the 
marriage ceremony, and be regularly joined in the holy bands of 
matrimony.’  This was the only compulsory marriage statute enacted 
by a Confederate state during the postbellum period.  The statute 
required couples to solemnize their relationships within nine months 
after the passage of the Act, or be subject to prosecution for the 
misdemeanor offense of ‘fornication and adultery.’112 
In addition to state actions to ratify the marriages of freedmen, the 
Freedmen’s Bureau served as licenser and record keeper of freedmen 
marriages.113  This task of assuring these marriages was most unusual, 
for it was the first time in history that the federal government would 
enter into the personal lives of citizens.114  Couples who were not 
separated during slavery approached the Freedman’s Bureau for 
assistance.115  Post-Emancipation, the Bureau performed marriages and 
recorded and issued certificates related to freedman marriages.  This 
work was a small percentage of the Bureau’s, and the records fail to 
reflect the rates of marriage. 
Both states and the Freedman’s Bureau showed a keen interest in 
the marriage of former slaves.  Revisiting post-bellum freedmen 
marriages through an interest-convergence lens begs the question, were 
the sanctioned marriages merely a collateral benefit of self-interested 
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whites?  Perhaps marriage served whites as much if not more than the 
freedmen.  As with Bell’s interest convergence theory as applied to the 
Brown decision, a different historical perspective suggests that marriage 
of former slaves appealed to three separate groups.  These groups’ 
interests are similar to the four groups to whom the Brown decision 
appealed.116 
B.  Whose Interest Did Post-Emancipation State Ratification of Slave 
Marriages Serve? 
The wholesale ratification or affirmation of slave marriages by 
states appealed to several interest groups.  Historians have discussed at 
length the role of marriage promotion as an urgent policy priority during 
slavery’s collapse and the initiation of a new political and social order.117 
1.  The Interest of Freedmen, Anti-Slavery Advocates, and Moral 
Groups 
The right to marry has been a symbol of humanity and freedom.118  
“While whites often dismissed the value black couples placed on their 
wedding rites and tried to manipulate Black marriages for political 
control, [freedmen] often saw marriage as an institutional sanction for 
their families and a platform from which to assert citizenship and 
political participation.”119  The legitimacy of marriage for Blacks and the 
expectations of ensuing liberty rights coincided, for the most part, with 
those concerned about the immorality of racial inequality. 
To the newly emancipated, marriage meant training for citizenship, 
escape from state control through the Freedmen’s Bureau, and a new 
beginning.  Some moral and perhaps religious whites viewed marriage as 
a natural right in accordance with Locke and other philosophers.  
Antislavery advocates had a genuine concern for the lack of freedmen’s 
right to legal marriages.120  Ample historical support indicates religious 
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abolitionist societies, such as the American Missionary Association and 
the National Freedmen’s Relief Organization funded and sent volunteers 
to assist freedmen marriages.121 
States and the Freedmen’s Bureau proceeded to establish, and in 
some cases reaffirm, freedmen family ties and biological ties in a manner 
most consistent with the monogamous norms of white marital 
relationships.122  In some cases, Bureau agents were confronted with 
multiple spouses due to family disruption through slave sells or one 
household with children with multiple fathers.123  Traditional history 
credits the Freedmen’s Bureau for championing freedman marriages and 
helping reunite families separated by the slave system.124  However, 
interest-convergence tells a different story.  The Freedmen’s Bureau’s 
policies for accomplishing these tasks were two-sided: assuring the 
newly emancipated their right to liberty, while simultaneously warning 
that freedom came with a steep price tag – being barred from state 
dependency.125  The ratification of freedman marriages accomplished the 
privatization of poverty.126 
As optimistic as freedmen were, scholars have shown that freedmen 
were also resistant to marriage in the manner proscribed.127  Their 
resistance can be explained by examining the terms and conditions under 
which the marriages took place.  Interest-convergence theory suggests 
that Blacks did not transition from slavery to civil society on their own 
terms.  Instead, marriage and its (false) promises of citizenship came on 
the non-negotiable terms of whites.128  There is historical evidence that 
some freedmen sought a right to not marry and a right to remarry; rights 
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that were ignored.129  The benefits of legal marriage hardly resembled 
the quasi-marital norms Blacks experienced prior to emancipation.130  
For instance, once married, newly freedmen had to conform to the 
familial model thrust upon them rather than their own choosing.131  They 
could not retain their family models adopted during slavery, models that 
had a longstanding history of maintaining extended kinship networks, 
which often also incorporated non-relatives as adoptive kin.  These were 
traditions of familial flexibility, first developed under slavery, that 
shaped their conceptions of family.132  Post-bellum marriage for 
freedwomen not only starkly contrasted with white wives, it was a major 
reality check on their expectations — the sobering recognition that the 
system had conscripted them (back) into servitude through marriage.133 
2.  Interests of Those Who Opposed Race Mixing 
The ratification of Slave marriages and the legitimization of 
children appealed to groups that opposed race mixing and those who 
feared for the physical safety of white women.  Southern states had a low 
number of white men available to care for and protect white men.  Many 
white women were single and in many ways vulnerable after the Civil 
War.  Laws against miscegenation were on the books in most Southern 
states, but the disruption of the Civil War made the possibility of race 
mixing more likely.  A powerful myth of African sexuality became both 
the reason and the excuse for the rape of slave women and the distrust of 
slave men.134  This increased sexual nature or primal instinct made slave 
women insatiable and irresistible as seductresses, and unable to be raped 
based on their status as property.135  The heightened sexual nature of 
slave men placed all white women at risk.136  Legal and extra-legal 
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means were used to tame the sexual instincts of both slave men and 
women.  Laws were enacted early in American history to preserve racial 
purity while other laws were enacted to preserve slavery in light of 
interracial sexuality.137  These concerns about interracial sexuality were 
enhanced with the Emancipation.  The broad ratification of freedmen 
marriage offered the possibility of decreased interracial contact.  The 
freedmen would have assigned sexual partners.  In addition, there might 
have been hope the Whites and Blacks would respect monogamy implied 
by vows of marriage. 
3.  States’ Interests in Freedmen Marriages 
States, through political power brokers, had the greatest interest in 
the ratification of slave marriages.  Endorsing marriages under the guise 
of promoting freedmen’s interests reasserted the institutional stronghold 
on Blacks that slavery once maintained.  For example, in 1867, 
Kentucky’s newly elected Governor John L. Helm stated in his inaugural 
address that state lawmaker’s role would be to help Blacks position 
themselves “within the social and economic order.”138   
“Helm believed that black Kentuckians' freedom would be enacted 
primarily through social relations, rather than through the exercise of 
individual rights . . . [and that they] ‘must understand . . . that white 
men will rule Kentucky. We are not yet sunk so low as to consent to 
be governed by negroes.’”139 
In light of the Southern states’ economic downturn, “positioning 
themselves within the order” meant a return for Black Kentuckians to 
their former state of subordination to whites.  This was Kentucky 
policymakers’ only viable alternative—exchange its institution of 
slavery, grounded in the structure of law, for the coercive power of 
marriage, labor contracts, and child apprentices, as freedmen’s supposed 
path to liberty rights and citizenship.140  Endorsing marriages, and their 
promises, would impose a “moral influence” barrier in their path to true 
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liberty rights for freedmen.141  In other words, with marriage as the 
barometer for fitness for their citizenship, the Freedman’s Bureau would 
no longer be necessary to protect freedmen once they became citizens.142  
It might also be said that marriage was a badge of civilization and sign of 
domestication similar to education and land ownership.143  States 
through the ratification of freedman marriages would be able to represent 
to the Union that the state was prepared to treat freedmen kindly and that 
the military control and occupation were no longer necessary. 
Ratification of these marriages served judicial economy.  Because 
the slave system did not recognize formal parental rights of children 
born into slavery, these children would become wards of the state.144  
Without marriage, inheritance and legitimacy issues would loom before 
courts.  Take, for example, the history of President Thomas Jefferson 
and his secret affair with Sally Hemings.  Scholars and historians 
uncovered that several of the children that Jefferson sired by Sally 
Hemings sought to pass themselves for white.145  Eston Hemings, 
emancipated in 1827 by Jefferson’s will, along with his older brother 
Madison Hemings, probably sought marriages that would ensure that 
their children would inherit.146  This illustrates the complexities of the 
inheritance and legitimacy issues of children born of a slave woman by a 
white man.  Freedmen marriage therefore, not only relieved states of the 
burden of supporting freedmen women and children, it also relieved 
white men who fathered children with slaves of the duty to financially 
support their children.  Ratifying freedmen marriages removed many 
foreseeable strains on the legal system.147 
The ratification of freedmen marriages enhanced a State’s financial 
well-being.  Marriage prescribed white familial norms onto the 
freedmen, thus requiring a working father and a dependent wife and 
children.148  Labor and the support of family became an obligation of 
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newly freedmen through marriage.  This would release the state 
government from its duty to care for indigent women and children.149  
The establishment of these economic norms and gender roles shifted the 
financial responsibility of freedwomen and children from the state to 
husbands, moving poverty from the public sphere to private spaces.  The 
tender and practical interests of freedmen, abolitionists, and moral 
groups do little to compare to the restorative and economic interests of 
states in freedmen marriages. 
CONCLUSION 
Interest-convergence theory sheds new light on post-bellum slave 
marriages, displaying other groups’ interests at work rather than 
freedmen’s rights.  Traditional history informed us that slavery’s end 
marked a release from coercive state control and a beginning of liberty 
rights for former slaves.150  However, interest-convergence reveals that 
freedmen’s marriage was a mere instrumentality of a new relationship 
between the newly emancipated and the state.151  Although freedmen’s 
development to citizenship was the facial purpose of ratifying marriages, 
the actual interests served were those of policymakers and poor whites.  
With interest-convergence as a forward-looking device, the landmark 
decision of Brown conceivably was an extension of whites’ interests 
served, borne of granting former slaves the right to marry. 
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